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The result and aftermath of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union has generated considerable attention, not just among observers of British politics. 
Even if some of wider context that shaped the referendum is far from unique to the UK, 
the road to Brexit is a product of distinct pathologies of the British state and politics that 
will introduce its own distinctive ways of doing policy and politics: With a state already 
under strain, a politics that is increasingly divided, and its people(s) discontented, the 
challenges confronting Britain’s ways of governing are substantial. This essay considers 
three analytical lenses, or ‘mega-trends’, through which to view the decision of the 
Cameron government to call the referendum: (1) the electoral politics perspective that 
focuses on the populist-nationalist turn and fragmentation of the British party system, (2) 
the dominant policy paradigm perspective that points to a silent crisis of the neoliberal 
policy consensus that had governed Britain since the 1970s, and (3) the referendum as a 
side-effect of both depoliticisation and the politics of the regulatory state. Based on these 
perspectives, we reflect on the potential implications of Brexit for the future of the British 




Brexit – the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from membership of the European 
Union (EU) following the result of the referendum of 23rd June 2016 in which 52 percent 
of voters responded ‘leave’ to the question ‘Should the United Kingdom remain a member 
of the European Union or leave the European Union?’ – represents a critical juncture for 
the study and practice of politics. How did a country that a few years earlier appeared to 
be confident on the world stage and broadly at peace with itself, choose to engage in a 
divisive referendum and subsequently a snap election campaign, leaving it polarised in 
terms of public opinion, destabilised in terms of its territorial politics, with a return to two-
party politics in England under two far from centrist political leaders, and an electoral 
map that makes it unlikely that any party will command a large majority in parliament in 
the near future? 
 
By the time of the general election of June 2017, there was cause to ask whether Britain had 
turned into a new version of the ‘sick man’ that had been widely portrayed in the 1970s 
(King 1975). In contrast to the relative economic decline of the 1970s, however, the mid-to 
late 2010s ‘sick man’ could be linked to territorial discontent (with recurrent calls for a 
second referendum on Scottish independence and continued suspension of the power-
sharing agreement in Northern Ireland), a Labour Party divided between its leader and 
membership on one side and parliamentary party on the other, a Conservative Party that 
was deeply divided between its conservative and libertarian wings as well as its economic 
nationalist faction, and an austerity-depleted public service that was unsure about what a 
Brexit settlement might look like. 
 
In this essay, we draw on the well-known story of the English monarch King Canute (for 
some, Cnut). According to legend, Canute’s inability to hold back the tide exposed the 
limits of his powers to watching courtiers (see Hay 2009 who summarises three variants of 
the legend and considers whether these share the moral of the ‘triumph of structure over 
agency’). The modern day equivalent would therefore be to question whether today’s 
Canutes can make Brexit a success by holding the ‘waves’ of interdependency at bay and 
thereby craft a bright new future for the British state and its people built on national 
sovereignty (such as Boris Johnson’s imagining of the ‘sunlit land beyond’ during the 
referendum campaign1). Others might see such an attempt as futile as any attempt to hold 
back the global tide of interdependent economies and governance – where Brexit is the 
product of the short-term political decisions of an exhausted political elite and a fractured 
party system. 
 
This essay focuses on the context in which a referendum on EU membership became an 
attractive – or politically necessary – proposition for Canute’s contemporary equivalents. 
It is less interested in whether (and how) modern days Canutes will be able to hold back 
the tides of interdependence after Brexit. While there are a growing number of 
authoritative accounts of the events that led to Brexit itself (e.g. Evans and Menon 2017), 
and the behaviour of voters (e.g. Hobolt 2016; Lee et al. 2018), our focus is on the 
underlying forces that made the calling of a referendum on EU membership an attractive 
proposition for the Cameron government (as latter day Canutes). Specifically, we discuss 
                                                 




three ‘mega-trends’ that contributed to the decision to call a Brexit referendum and the 
subsequent result and seek to extrapolate their potential implications for post-Brexit 
politics. In the analysis that follows, we first discuss three perspectives regarding the 
origins of the referendum before, more speculatively, extrapolating from these the kind of 
futures that might emerge from Brexit.  
 
Three mega-trends to the EU referendum  
As noted, this essay is interested in the systemic conditions that shaped the context 
leading to the referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU (marking the critical 
juncture at the end of an era that had begun with the UK’s initial decision to apply for EEC 
membership in 1961). We consider why the Cameron government – our modern day 
Canutes – came to offer a referendum to the British people in June 2016. We explore three 
distinct, but overlapping, ‘mega-trends’: (1) the electoral politics perspective that identifies 
populist-nationalist trends and the fragmentation of the British party system that 
contributed to pressures to call the referendum, (2) the policy paradigm perspective that 
points to growing disaffection with the dominant neoliberal policy consensus, and (3) the 
use of the referendum as a political tool to deflect from the regulatory state’s side effects of 
hyper-politicisation and the unmanageability of internal party divisions (Moran 2001). 
 
Concentrating on these mega-trends might appear unnecessarily complicated. After all, 
popular accounts of Brexit highlight how the referendum was called due to the increasing 
internal ungovernability of the Conservative Party (Oliver 2016; Shipman 2016). Some also 
suggest that the pledge to hold a referendum was a blunder resulting from the mistaken 
expectation ahead of the 2015 general election – influenced by an industry-wide polling 
failure (Sturgis et al. 2016) – that another coalition government was likely and would 
thereby void any party manifesto commitments made by David Cameron’s Conservative 
Party. However, such accounts need to recognise the underlying conditions that 
contributed to such internal party dynamics and shape the choices of policymakers. As 
Jessop (2017) notes, Brexit was both a singular event and a symptom of an ongoing crisis 
of the British state and society.  
 
We therefore need to understand why the 21st Century equivalents of the courtiers in the 
court of King Canute pushed for a referendum and did so successfully. These mega-trends 
therefore cannot explain why individuals chose to vote for (or against) Brexit on 23rd June 
2016. However, these mega-trends illustrate what shaped the context of the decision to 
hold the Brexit referendum and how they might be expected to have consequences in the 





Table 1. Three perspectives on Brexit 
Perspective Why did Brexit referendum 
happen? 
What next? 
Electoral politics and 
fragmentation of the party 
system 
Level: voters (and parties) 
Populism, fractured politics 
and anti-politics (paving the 
way for populist campaigning), 
salience of immigration, 
fueling internal party conflict 
Campaigning on notion of 
betrayal leads to rampant 
populism (e.g. ‘will of the 
people’) 
Neoliberal policy paradigm 
 
 
Level: policy (and institutions) 
Silent crisis of the neoliberal 
policy paradigm of the global 
capitalist state weakens 
‘restraint’ on challenging 
fundamental economic 
structures 
Either (i) emergence of a new 
paradigm that will be more 
responsive (improbable), or (ii) 
extreme depoliticisation to 





Level: the state 
Spectacle politics to overcome 
failure of party politics to 
resolve conflicts (and over-
confidence of elites in their 
powers of persuasion over 
mass publics) 
Ongoing spectacles to maintain 
illusion of governing in view 
of helplessness due to 
international interdependence 
and transnational regulatory 
cooperation 
 
These three mega-trends operate at different levels – they focus on the level of voters (and 
parties), policy (and institutions), and the state – though these are inevitably interrelated. 
They also respond to a much broader question that has been at the heart of traditional 
political science – namely how the logics of politics and markets (or capitalism) can be 
combined or whether the contradictions between these two logics will inevitably lead to a 
system breakdown (Streeck 2006). They also link to contemporary debates about the 
relationship between domestic politics and transboundary policy challenges and 
administrative policy-making (e.g. Stone and Ladi 2015; Boin and Lodge 2016). The 
context of Brexit therefore offers an important test of the ways in which the logics of 
politics and markets interact, with different perspectives pointing to specific dynamics. 
We discuss each of these mega-trends in turn – highlighting their contrasts whilst 
acknowledging that elements overlap and that we need to paint with a broad brush rather 
than offer fine-grained accounts. 
 
Electoral politics and fragmentation of the party system  
What, then, led Prime Minister David Cameron – who opposed Britain leaving the EU –
stage a politically risky and uncontrollable referendum? Drawing on the story of Canute, 
this symbolic act could be viewed as an attempt to resist the electoral tide and to squash 
internal party divisions once and for all. According to the perspective of electoral politics, 
the referendum can be understood as a consequence of the growing electoral force of the 
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UK Independence Party (UKIP) (Ford and Goodwin 2014) – riding high in the polls and 
winning two high profile by-elections from the Conservatives in 2014 – attracting support 
as a result of rising public concern about immigration and its increasing association with 
Eurosceptic attitudes (see Mellon and Evans 2015). This electoral threat to the 
Conservative Party, which fed into the Conservative Party’s continuing inability to resolve 
internal feuding over the EU since the 1990s, led to the promise of an ‘in-out’ referendum 
on membership of the EU in its manifesto at the 2015 general election, with the party’s 
surprise majority defying the polls (Sturgis et al. 2016) and unexpectedly requiring 
Cameron to deliver on the pledge.2  
 
In broader terms, the referendum has to be seen in the context of the passing of the age of 
party democracy (Mair 2013) and as an attempt to overcome the fracturing of British 
politics – as observed in the growing divide between those people living in areas closely 
connected to global growth and those not (Jennings and Stoker 2016) and in the 
fragmentation of the party system (Green and Prosser 2016). Following Peter Mair (2013), 
cartelised parties in advanced western democracies increasingly ‘rule the void’, 
disconnected from wider society. Mainstream parties were thus left vulnerable to populist 
challengers such as UKIP – where European integration, the archetypal elite project, 
became ‘a hammer with which to beat the establishment' (Mair 2013, p. 114). Combined 
with this, the metropolitan elite consensus arguably led David Cameron to over-estimate 
the electoral base of support for Remain (Farrell and Newman 2017). The calling of the 
referendum thus was symptomatic of an over-confident approach of the ruling cartel 
based in London to the tide of electoral politics – creating an opportunity for the populist 
Leave campaign to appeal to voters who were disengaged and disenchanted with 
mainstream parties (see Hobolt 2016). 
 
Public disaffection with (establishment) politics had been steadily on the rise for several 
decades (Jennings et al. 2017; Clarke et al. 2018), further fueled by events such as the 
parliamentary expenses scandal of 2009. Accordingly, the referendum can be seen as 
political responsiveness to populist critiques of representative politics, i.e. the exclusion of 
the working class from political representation (Evans and Tilley 2017). This undercut 
appeals to ‘responsible’ party government – whereby voters entrusted politicians to take 
decisions in the public interest – and instead pushed politicians to more populist styles of 
decision-making. The pledge to hold the referendum in the Conservative Party manifesto 
in 2015 was phrased in anti-political terms, declaring ‘it is time for the British people – not 
politicians – to have their say’ (Conservative Party 2015, p. 72).  
 
Accordingly, the referendum on Brexit offered a platform for voters to voice their long-
simmering discontent against the elite, or ‘political class’ (Allen and Cairney 2017; Allen 
2018) – as already had occurred (albeit on a smaller scale) during the referendums on a 
regional assembly for the North East of England in 2004 and on electoral reform for UK 
parliamentary elections (the Alternative Vote) in 2011 – with proposals resoundingly 
                                                 
2
 Note the important difference to the US where the rise of Trump has been, in part, explained by the collapse of the 
party elites’ ability to control candidate nominations. Arguably, the Cameron ‘A-lists’ during the 2010 and 2015 
elections were broadly successful attempts at central party management of candidate selection (with some exceptions, 
due to local constituency mobilisation, e.g. Rees-Mogg in North East Somerset). 
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rejected by voters and where Conservative and other Leave campaigners had already 
supported anti-political elite positions.  
 
These longer-term trends were accentuated by the electoral politics of immigration which, 
in turn, played a significant factor in the events leading to the referendum being called 
and in the Brexit vote itself. Immigration had been on the rise since the late 1990s, and the 
upward trend accelerated substantially following enlargement of the EU in 2004. Public 
opinion about immigration responded thermostatically to policy, with increased support 
for more restriction (Ford et al. 2015). These dynamics were initially to the benefit of the 
Conservatives while in opposition (Evans and Chzhen 2013). However, later the inability 
of Cameron’s government to deliver on its ambitious target of reducing net migration to 
‘tens of thousands’ – created pressure for reform of the terms of Britain’s relationship with 
the EU. The failure to secure such a deal ultimately led Cameron to call the referendum. 
Just as with Mair’s argument, the elite policy consensus created space for a populist 
challenge (and thus accounts for the effectiveness of the Leave campaign slogan ‘take back 
control’3). Returning to the tale of Canute, the referendum thus was an attempt to stem the 
tide of anti-politics – a tide that in part had been fueled by political elites. Facing rising 
disaffection Prime Minister David Cameron looked to a referendum to ‘settle the matter’ 
and move the agenda on.     
 
The call for a referendum and the Brexit vote therefore encapsulated the rise of a specific 
British, Eurosceptic brand of populism, such as documented in Ford and Goodwin’s (2014) 
Revolt on the Right, enabled by a growing link between immigration and Euroscepticism 
(Evans and Mellon 2015). As we will consider later, this situation was associated with the 
specific demand-led model of economic growth adopted by the Blair government in the 
late 1990s – which in part depended on population growth, increasing demand for 
migrant labour. It also, however, manifested a global trend of ‘cultural backlash’ (Inglehart 
and Norris 2016) across advanced democracies, specifically with older, less educated, 
working class, white men reacting against social and cultural change of recent decades. 
 
In other words, the electoral politics perspective highlights the changing context for both 
voters and parties, to which our modern day Canutes sought to respond in calling the 
referendum. It highlights the growing responsiveness of established parties to populist 
agendas and messages, by suggesting that these issues – such as immigration – could be 
‘managed’. Once this professional, strategic style of politics became one of the lines of 
attack against established parties and once parties in general had begun campaigning on 
the basis of ‘people, not politicians’ having their say, there was a certain inevitability to the 
announcement of a referendum on the UK’s continued membership of the EU. 
 
The crisis of the neoliberal policy paradigm  
The second mega-trend suggests that the calling of a referendum on Britain’s membership 
of the EU was a product of the crisis of the dominant neoliberal policy paradigm of the 
late 20th century which itself was born of a crisis of the post-war consensus (Hall et al. 
1978; Gamble 1988). That ‘neo-liberal’ policy paradigm had pursued a project of 
                                                 
3
 The slogan ‘take back control’ raises the question whether this is the equivalent of Canute’s courtiers 
demanding that he hold back the tide.  
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depoliticisation and ‘discipline’, with the removal of policy tasks from elected bodies to 
non-majoritarian institutions (Roberts 2010), the outright transfer of public functions to the 
private sphere and a removal of contestation over economic and social policy issue by 
adopting a technocratic discourse of there being ‘no alternative’ (Hay 2007). This 
paradigm was accompanied by a shift from ‘responsive’ to ‘responsible’ party government 
(Mair 2013), where credibility and prudence were seen as electoral vote-winners and 
seemed to have displaced the politics of redistribution. This also included the transfer of 
considerable risk from the ‘collective’ to the individual.  This mega-trend therefore also 
presents something of a puzzle: why did elites engage in a risky experiment in direct 
democracy – when their preferred mode of governing is to delegate and to remove issues 
from the political realm (Flinders 2008)? Was this a last gasp attempt to defy the turning of 
the (policy) tide? 
 
The neoliberal paradigm was punctured by the events of the global financial crisis, 
undermining the commitment of a generation of policy-makers to the ‘logic of the market’. 
At the global level, it has been argued that initial policy responses to the financial crisis 
reinforced rather than challenged the paradigm of global markets (see Hall 2013; Blyth 
2013) and led to the austerity-related ‘consolidation state’ (Streeck 2017) in which states 
were accused of being primarily receptive to financial markets. To illustrate, the initial 
response of the UK government (as well as other national governments) to the crisis 
briefly suggested that the state was ‘back’, such as with its bank bailout packages and 
‘cash for bangers’ (vehicle scrappage) scheme (designed to stimulate the car industry). At 
the same time, the bank bailout regime highlighted the structural weakness of the UK 
government versus the banking sector in comparison to, for example, the US (Culpepper 
and Reinke 2014). However, the pendulum quickly swung back towards the austerity 
paradigm under the coalition government, with attempts at shrinking the state through 
cutbacks to the civil service, privatisation of state-owned and nationalised assets, and 
reductions in public expenditure in those policy areas that were not ring-fenced.  
 
The calling of a referendum on EU membership appears surprising not just in that it was 
contradictory to a preference for depoliticisation: EU membership was seen as essential to 
the existing economic policy paradigm. Under this interpretation, the referendum may be 
seen as a ‘mistake’, a gamble taken under the belief that dominant economic-financial 
interest would ensure the ‘right’ result (continued membership). Alternatively, it might be 
interpreted as a weakening of the once dominant paradigm in that it reflected a degree of 
responsiveness to interests fundamentally at odds with the ideology of the political elite. It 
was the crisis of the existing paradigm that made it vulnerable to challenges from both 
protectionist and ‘free trade’ populists. Indeed, it might even be argued that financial 
interests were integrated, in general, more in global than EU markets, and therefore 
insufficiently interested in actively engaging over continued EU membership by keeping a 
referendum off the agenda (see also Jensen and Snaith 2016). 
 
The electoral ‘mega-trend’ we noted earlier exerted pressure on the modern day Canutes 
in part due to the context of an ongoing legitimacy crisis ‘as successive neoliberal projects 
failed to deliver nationwide prosperity and, in addition, created conditions for fisco-
financial crisis’ (Jessop 2017, p. 134). The result of the EU referendum thus marked a 
critical moment in which the politics of (financial) markets – and the warnings of 
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economic experts and the policy elite, most notably in the Treasury and the Bank of 
England (labelled by their opponents as ‘project fear’) – were willfully ignored by voters 
discontented with the status quo – anemic economic growth, stagnant wages, unaffordable 
housing and falling home ownership, and crumbling public services. This accounts for the 
seeming resonance of the Leave campaign’s infamous pledge of repatriating ‘£350 million’ 
a week funding for the NHS, a message that cut through with many voters. It also 
reflected a rejection of claims that there was ‘no alternative’. The morning after the 
referendum, the UKIP leader Nigel Farage presented it as a bloody nose to the status quo: 
‘We have fought against the multinationals. We have fought against the big merchant banks. 
We have fought against big politics’.4  
 
Much like the crisis of the previous (welfare state) paradigm, this was a crisis of legitimacy 
of the state and a loss of confidence in its favoured policy instruments (Hall et al. 1978; 
Hall 1993). The Brexit vote thus was interpreted by elites, most notably the new Prime 
Minister, Theresa May, as representing a demand for a critical break from austerity and 
the wider neoliberal paradigm. This message also resonated during the general election of 
June 2017 – where Labour had campaigned on the slogan ‘for the many, not the few’, 
promising a rolling back of the paradigm through policies such as the scrapping of student 
fees and renationalization of railways.  
 
At the level of policy paradigms, then, the referendum emerged out of an ongoing crisis of 
the neoliberal consensus that had dominated since the 1980s. The financial crisis and its 
aftermath created conditions under which dominant assumptions were increasingly 
questioned, especially in the context of growing salience of immigration (as noted above). 
At the same time, an EU referendum was seen as insufficiently important by those 
benefitting most from the existing neo-liberal paradigm to keep it off the agenda (leading 
today’s Canutes to dare to dabble with referendum as a political device). In response, the 
Brexit vote was, at least in part, a protest of voters against the ‘responsible’ and ‘no 
alternative’ consensus offered by political elites. Disappointment with the (lack of) 
economic and social progress under the existing policy paradigm, especially concentrated 
in areas subject to long-term economic decline under successive Labour and Conservative 
governments – exacerbated by the fiscal squeeze brought on by the financial crisis – 
created conditions that were ripe for voters to defy the advice of the political 
establishment.5 The referendum result thus reflected a challenge to an entrenched policy 
paradigm that has been increasingly under strain. By June 2016, even economists at the 
IMF were noting the failure of neoliberal policy to deliver (Ostry et al. 2016).  
 
The hyper-politicised regulatory state  
The two perspectives noted above highlighted conditions which facilitated the growing 
calls for a referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU and for the subsequent result. 
However, they still raise the question as to why political elites resorted to the referendum 
as a tool of political strategy in the first place, thereby making themselves vulnerable to 
                                                 
4 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/nigel-farage-basks-in-the-triumph-of-his-new-dawn (last accessed 
8 September 2017). 
5 The vote to leave the EU tended to be highest in those areas that had experienced relative economic decline in recent 
decades (Jennings et al. 2017). 
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protest votes with far-reaching consequences. After all, no politician could have failed to 
recognise the extent of public disillusionment with ‘the political class’, ‘Westminster elite’, 
and ‘London bubble’, which had been on the rise for decades (Allen 2018; Clarke et al. 
2018).  
 
Following Moran (2003), it might be argued that the referendum on Britain’s membership 
of the EU represents another example of the ‘age of fiasco’ under the regulatory state – as a 
crisis of the governing order. According to Moran, the British regulatory state developed 
through a process of hyper-innovation in reaction to the policy crisis of the 1970s, and also 
due to exhaustion of the old ‘club system’ of governing. That club had ruled for centuries 
through informality, oligarchy and social elitism. The rise of the regulatory state in the 
period since promised the displacement of old elites and their informality and the creation 
of synoptic and disciplined control instruments.  
 
In the place of ‘club government’ emerged a dynamic of a centralising, colonising and 
rule-based state that widened the scope of social and economic life subject to control – 
shifting government away from direct intervention (such as via public ownership) and the 
delivery of services, towards a regulatory mode of governing. This new regulatory state 
was also inextricably linked with expansion of the European regulatory state, in part 
driven by UK policy elites themselves in order to enhance internationalised markets. This 
new epoch of hyper-innovation, Moran argues, consequently reduced the scope for 
engagement in meaningful national politics and policy-making which proved particularly 
fateful given a political elite primed to rule through informality and immediate 
discretionary leverage. It also fed into a policy narrative that removed ‘popular voice’ in 
favour of executive-driven decision-making in seemingly arcane EU-related committees 
(that, ironically, the UK government machine was extremely good at influencing).  
 
However, one of the unintended countervailing effects of the regulatory state was, 
according to Moran, growing hyper-politicisation, not just in fields of regulatory 
governance. As a result of this increasing lack of discretionary ‘club government’ at the 
national level, there was, he argued, an increasing turn to symbolic politics over 
governing, such as through the promotion of spectacles and mega-projects, such as the 
Millennium Dome and High Speed Rail II. Hyper-politicisation was further expressed in 
political grandstanding in opposition to regulatory arrangements. This context of the 
regulatory state in Britain also gave rise to a growing prevalence of policy catastrophes. 
This ‘age of policy fiasco’ is attributed by Moran (2001, p. 415) to an ‘incomplete 
penetration of the regulatory state’ – as residues of the old club system remained, 
encouraging series of ‘government blunders’ (King and Crewe 2013; Jennings et al. 2017). 
Resorting to symbolic politics in terms of blame-fingering the EU for domestic policy 
decisions and problems was therefore also part of the internal self-destructive tendencies 
of the British, but internationalised regulatory state. Ironically, one dynamic of the 
regulatory state, namely a radical elite project at replacing ‘old elites’ used the EU as proxy 
for its attempts at removing the ‘old elite’, even though EU membership in fact supported 
expansion of the regulatory state in Britain.  
 
If one interprets Canute’s attempts at holding back the tide as a spectacle (Hay 2009), then 
relying on the referendum device can be also seen as a symbolic politics response in the 
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age of the regulatory state. In other words, the increasing retreat of policy-makers to 
resolve policy conflicts through referendums reflects the exhaustion of ‘normal’ politics 
and the temptation for elites to stage spectacles for voting publics. It is therefore not 
surprising that referenda were also a feature of the 1970s (on EEC membership and 
devolution), just when traditional political orthodoxies were coming undone and the state 
was said to be suffering from ‘overload’ (King 1975).  
 
Since the use of referendums to determine public support for devolution for Scotland and 
Wales in 1997, there seemingly has been an increase in the frequency of calls for 
referendums in Britain. Such demands reflect the rise of populist sentiment over this 
period, and the belief that the institutions of representative democracy cannot make 
authoritative decisions without the blessing of citizens (and increasing dominance of the 
‘delegate’ model of democracy and its expectations of responsiveness). At the same time, 
referendums have become popular with parties – as tools of depoliticisation for managing 
internal divisions on major issues, and as opportunities to divide opponents or to use 
public opinion to legitimise decisions.  
 
Accordingly, calls for referendums relating to Britain’s relationship with the EU have been 
a consistent feature of British politics since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This became part 
of the formal policy agenda in 2004 under the Labour government, when Prime Minister 
Tony Blair pledged to hold a referendum on the ratification of the European Constitution 
Treaty. Fulfilling that pledge was avoided because of the withdrawal and subsequent 
renegotiation of that treaty. The period after signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 saw 
pledges of referendums from both the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats. 
More generally, the 2016 referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU can be seen as a 
consequence of the exhaustion of the main political actors: where parties were no longer 
able to maintain coherence in the face of changing socio-economic electoral cleavages and 
turned to spectacle and campaigning to signify their continued relevance and power given 
their diminished role in policy-making. In turn, this focus on campaigning distracts from 
the constitutional role of parties as contributing meaningfully to decision-making in 
legislative and executive arenas.  
 
Moran’s argument regarding the tensions of the regulatory state becomes particularly 
relevant when pointing to the growing frustration of the ruling ‘club’ with the limitations 
and constraints of governing through the regulatory state.6 The lack of meaningful and 
domestically visible political choice regarding public policy has led to ever more high-
stakes spectacles, fired on by opponents of the existing system (such as UKIP and their 
international allies) and further motivated by attempts to defuse internal party conflicts. In 
other words, the self-fulfilling dynamics of the regulatory state – namely growing 
codification, internationalisation and the creation of systems of formal controls to reduce 
scope for domestic political contestation – fuelled opposition by the political elite to these 
developments, even though this same elite largely benefitted from the innovations of the 
regulatory state itself. As Moran noted, the regulatory state was intended to ‘depoliticise’, 
                                                 
6 It might also be argued that hyper-centralisation of the regulatory state makes management of territorial 
conflict within the UK ever more problematic. 
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but ended up being hyper-politicised, Similarly, the hyper-politicisation of the issue of EU 
membership contributed to the conditions that encouraged the referendum to be held.  
 
In other words, Brexit might be seen as another major policy fiasco that emerged in the 
context of the hyper-politicised British regulatory state. In this particular case, the fiasco is 
defined by the referendum failing to provide any of the expected benefits of spectacle 
politics for the Cameron government but rather leading to even further weakening of the 
traditional party system and alignments (Jennings and Stoker 2017). The attempt of some 
parts of the political establishment to reassert its discretionary power (via Brexit) clashes 
with the intentional logic of the regulatory state that has become embedded in economic 
and social life in the UK over the past three decades (and at the same time has ceded 
decision-making to transnational regulatory regimes). It might also be seen as a fiasco as 
the referendum result, rather than managing the Conservative Party’s internal divisions 
over the EU, has made this conflict mandated government policy and left wider societal 
dissensus unresolved. This enhances the conflict between politics and policy-making 
under the regulatory state, whose capacities are also increasingly constrained given the 
conflict between ‘optimal’ regulatory regimes that involve engaging with European and 
transnational regimes and responding to unclear national political preferences.  
 
What next? 
The story of King Canute ends after the demonstration of his lack of power to hold back 
the tide (leaving the reader with a range of take-home messages (Hay 2009)). In contrast, 
our modern day Canutes continue to be exposed to the aftermath of the Brexit 
referendum. The three mega-trends described above point to the fascinating nature of the 
Brexit experiment. These trends highlight several fundamental challenges affecting 
modern states, whether this involves the way in which (re-)nationalising electoral politics 
positions itself vis-a-vis transboundary policy challenges, how fragmented state and party 
organisations are supposed to be ‘responsive’ to divided societies, and how long-term 
policy-making is impeded by short-term single-issue electoral campaigns.  
 
What, then, does the future hold for a post-Brexit Britain? We are not modern-day Sibyls 
that can predict the future. However, each of the mega-trend briefly outlined above offers 
some insights as to what to expect. Each perspective offers a distinct version of the 
tensions between the logic of politics, of interdependent regulation, and of markets.7  
 
In view of electoral politics, the future might be said to be shaped by continuing division 
between one group of voters who are more likely to have voted to leave the EU, tend to be 
concerned about immigration and social change, prone to nostalgia and ethno-
nationalism, and another group that were more like to have voted to Remain, and are 
more open to migration, liberal on social issues, and more plural in their sense of identity.  
 
How far such an ‘open vs. closed society’ cleavage will fully replace the traditionally 
dominant economic left-right cleavage remains an open question. As shown in Figure 1, 
Brexit has resulted in polarisation of the economic perceptions of Leave and Remain 
                                                 
7 We of course assume that markets are created by rules, but suggest that market actors have different logics of action 
than administrative and political actors. 
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voters (though note that the effect is much more slight in expectations regarding personal 
finances than the national economy), and may reorder public attitudes elsewhere too – 
with the former viewing the country as headed in the right direction and latter seeing it as 
on the wrong track. Ultimately, the tension between these two camps creates opportunities 
for further exploitation by anti-system politicians (as well as pseudo-populists). After all, 
any Brexit deal secured by the government will likely be presented by opponents as a ‘sell 
out’ by the elite in Westminster and Whitehall. The effect would be a further fuelling a 
discontented public mood and potential for protest votes, destabilising the political 
agenda as prime ministers and ministers of whatever political colour scurry around 
seeking to satisfy populist demands in some way or another – while constrained by the 
timetable and limits of the Brexit deal and exposed to territorial instability. One potential 
outcome, then, is a more divided, discontented and unstable politics that renders post-
Brexit Britain ungovernable for a period of time at least.  
 
Figure 1. Economic perceptions, by Leave/Remain vote, 2014-2017 
 
 
Focusing on policy paradigms suggests two distinct possible versions of the future. In the 
first, the Brexit vote does indeed represent a critical juncture, with a shift towards a new 
unknown paradigm that is shaped by more redistributive policy goals and greater 
politicisation (i.e. contestation). This would mean that areas of public policy would return 
to the sphere of electoral politics and debate, with clearer ideological differentiation of 
possible policy means and ends. Indeed, public support for increased spending and higher 
taxes in the recent 2017 British Social Attitudes Survey is at its highest level since 2004 
(Clery et al. 2017). There might also be a reassertion of representative democracy in that 
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important questions of economic and social life return to the floor of parliamentary 
debate. More radically, the Brexit vote might indicate that the existing order of 
international liberal capitalism is headed for the scrapheap. The instability of the economic 
and international system – might give rise to emergence of a new style of national and 
international politics.  
 
The extent to which the Brexit referendum truly represents a critical juncture in the policy 
paradigm, remains to be seen – for example policy U-turns have already occurred on a 
number of issues, such as energy price caps or putting workers on company boards. How 
voters eager to expand the welfare state and the public sector would cope with rising tax 
bills in the context of continued wage stagnation is another matter. Accordingly, in the 
second alternative version, the Brexit referendum leads to a reassertion of the dominant 
policy paradigm of the so-called consolidation state (Streeck 2016; 2017). Rather than 
responding to public dissatisfaction with the existing policy consensus, elites may move to 
further depoliticise so as to avoid any repeats of the referendum vote. They might seek to 
achieve this through largely the same policy instruments: targeted austerity to reduce 
political mobilisation, and the increasing of policy complexity so as to avoid blame and 
reduce accountability. This will require scapegoats, such as public sector fat cats, 
university vice-chancellors, recalcitrant civil servants, and failing public services that are 
said to be short-changing citizens. Moral panics, such as around freedom of speech on 
university campuses, will be used to whip up support for the imposition of further rounds 
of managerialism (and withdrawal of state funds). There will also be an increase in the use 
of contracting out and further shrinking of the state, required to offset shortfalls in tax 
yields due to anaemic economic growth. For observers such as Streeck (2017), such a 
response is likely to fuel the kind of dynamics noted earlier, namely growing hostility of 
electorates towards policy-making elites. Indeed, it is also questionable whether there is 
much elite interest in enhancing representative politics – parliament is seen as standing in 
the way of ongoing shadowing of EU regulation (regardless of Brexit deal) for some, for 
others, parliament is part of problem in not representing citizens directly. In other words, 
according to this scenario, there would be neither change in economic nor political 
paradigms. 
 
The worlds of club government and the regulatory state offer another perspective on the 
possible future of post-Brexit Britain. Brexit – in whatever shape – offers the ruling club 
the prospect of more discretionary governing. However, the secular trends underlying 
development of the regulatory state, especially societal heterogenisation that undermines 
informal, elitist modes of governing and internationalised economies, are unlikely to go 
away (see also Bickerton 2017). Brexit thus paves the way for further policy fiascos: where 
the ‘club’ as represented by the traditional parties in Westminster is incapable of 
formulating a political response towards Brexit and where ethno-nationalist political 
campaigns against the regulatory state reduce the capacity of Britain’s governing 
institutions to contribute to and shape international regulatory arrangements, and to forge 
their own destiny in the international economic system. Such dynamics will not just prove 
problematic in considering the institutional arrangements of the regulatory state within an 
increasingly divided England, but will also place even greater strain on the territorial 





Indeed, by politicians explicitly rejecting their own capacity to contribute and shape 
international regulatory arrangements, the British regulatory state is likely to suffer 
further capacity reductions and even more likely to becoming a regulation-taker than 
‘shaper’. This ‘regulation-taking’ will at best be conducted through participation in 
technocratic networks. It could even be argued that it was this ‘hidden’ capacity of the 
regulatory state to shape international rules that provided the political ‘club’ in 
Westminster with the resources to entertain the kind of spectacle politics that led to the 
Brexit referendum. How Britain’s administrative machinery can maintain capacity under a 
political system that is stumbling from spectacle to spectacle in order to deflect attention 




As we have argued, Brexit offers a liminal moment for the future direction of British 
politics, and of politics more widely. The contours of a post-Brexit politics are shaped by 
the set of underlying mega-trends that led to the referendum vote itself and the ongoing 
attempt to reshape the way Britain is governed and how this impacts the relationship 
between voters, the political elite and the rest of the world.  
 
The rise in support for populist parties, the adoption of populist policies by mainstream 
parties in government and the historical track record of EU treaty referendum defeats 
since the 1990s suggest that the underlying dynamics that we identify are not necessarily 
specific to the UK. We have highlighted three distinct, though overlapping, mega-trends 
that point to the tension between responding to popular and electoral demands and the 
statecraft of making and delivering policy in the context of an increasingly globalised 
international economy. While these forces are not found only in the UK (indeed there are 
many national variants of populism and Euroscepticism across the EU), we would argue 
that their influence and combination is especially significant in the UK context. That the 
UK is, as yet, the only member state that has elected to leave the European Union might be 
a result of its detached political commitment and limited popular support for EU 
membership (relative to other member states). It is also possibly a result of its distinct 
finance-dominated economy and its hyper-centralised elite, and its unstable territorial 
politics (Moran 2017; Awan-Scully 2018).  
 
This essay has focused on the conditions that have led to the decision to hold a 
referendum on Britain’s membership in the EU and the likely repercussions for British 
politics. Whether the UK can be more successful than King Canute in the 11th century in 
holding back the tide is to be questioned in terms of resisting the demands of the modern 
global economy – indeed, it might be argued that Brexit tells us about the British state 
what King Canute suggested about the powers of the monarch back then: ‘Let all the 
world know that the power of kings is empty and worthless, and there is no King worthy 
of the name save Him by whose will heaven, earth and sea obey external laws’  
(Huntingdon 1996: p. 369). However, what this tale does not necessarily reveal is how 
much power King Canute (and his modern day equivalents) possess to hold back calls 
from courtiers to engage in symbolic spectacles, given the hyper-politicisation of the 
regulatory state with its elites committed to replacing all remains of what is regarded as an 
old ‘failed’ elite combined with territorial conflicts and disgruntled electorates. What the 
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electoral and administrative costs are to the UK of the apparent inability of political elites 
to resist these forces remains unclear – and troubling – given the potential threat they pose 
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